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ABSTRACT 
 
After describing the various forms of efficiency and calendar anomalies observed 
in many developed and emerging markets according to the existing literature, the 
present study examines this phenomenon empirically in the Nepalese stock market 
for daily data of Nepal Stock Exchange Index from February 1, 1995 to December 
31, 2004 covering approximately ten years. 
Using regression model with dummies, we find persistent evidence of day-of-the-
week anomaly but disappearing holiday effect, turn-of-the-month effect and time-
of-the-month effect. We also document no evidence of month-of-the-year anomaly 
and half-month effect. Our result for the month-of-the-year anomaly is consistent to 
the finding observed for the Jordanian stock market and that for the day-of-the-
week anomaly to the Greek stock market .In addition, our finding regarding half-
month effect is consistent with the US market. For the rest, we find inconsistent 
results with that in the international markets. Our results indicate that the 
Nepalese stock market is not efficient in weak form with regard to the day-of-the-





  In the past two decades, much evidence has accumulated on “calendar 
anomalies” in developed and emerging markets
1 followed by Fama’s (1970) 
influential paper, “Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical 
Work”. Calendar anomalies are empirical results that seem to be inconsistent with 
maintained theories of asset-pricing behavior (Schweret, 2002). The evidence of a 
growing number of these has led to a doubt on "Efficient Markets Hypothesis" 
These include the “seasonals” in stock returns. Stock returns, especially returns on 
small stock, are on average higher in January than in other months (Haugen & 
Lakonishok, 1988). Monday returns are on average lower than returns on other 
days (Cross, 1973; French, 1980; Gibbons & Hen, 1981). Returns are on average 
higher than the day before a holiday and the first-half-of-the-calendar month (Ariel, 
1987; Lakonishok & Smidt, 1988). In addition, returns are on average higher than 
turn-of-the-calendar month (Ariel, 1987; Lakonishok & Smidt, 1988) and the first-
third of the calendar month (Kohers & Patel, 1999)
2. 
  However, there is no study published in an international journal
3 exploring the 
stock price anomalies in the context of the Nepalese stock market. Therefore, the 
main objective of this study is to identify the stock price anomalies in the context 
of one of the emerging stock markets. More specifically, the study examines the 
existence of all types of seasonalities, namely, the month-of-the-year effect, day-
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emerging equity market is an equity market from a developing country. A developing 
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2 See Fama (1991) and Joshi (2004). 
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of-the-week effect, holiday effect, half-month effect, turn-of-the-month effect, and 
time-of-the-month effect in stock returns. In addition we also examine whether our 
results are analogous to those found in other markets. From another perspective, 
this study also tests the weak-form of market efficiency.
4 
  The study is organized into five sections. The first section commences with the 
introduction. The second section reviews the literature on market efficiency and 
calendar anomalies. Section three describes data sources and methodology used for 
the study. Section four consists of the empirical analysis and findings of the study. 
The final section presents summary and conclusions. 
 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
  This section consists of two parts. The first part deals with the concept and 
forms of market efficiency and the second part describes calendar anomalies and its 




  The concept of efficiency is central to finance. To an economist, efficiency of 
market has the simple meaning: the allocation of resources generated by the market 
is said to be efficient (Pareto optimal) if there does not exist an alternative feasible 
resource allocation which can make some individual better off without making 
someone worse off (Stiglitz, 1981). In the financial literature, however, the term 
efficient market takes a slightly different meaning .The two mostly widely applied 
definitions, both referring to informational efficiency, are the following. 
   “A capital market is efficient if all the information set φ is fully reflected in 
securities price” (Fama, 1970). 
   “A market is efficient with respect to information set φt if it is impossible to 
make economic profit by trading on the basis of information set φt. By economic 
profit, we mean the risk adjusted returns net of all costs” (Jensen, 1978). 
According to Stiglitz (1981), market efficiency (informational efficiency) used by 
financial economists is only the part of overall market efficiency.
5 
This requires that  
•  The market must provide the correct incentives for gathering the right 
amount and kind of information,  
•  The market prices must reflect the information available to the various 
traders, and  
•  The firms must be able to convey the information efficiently about their 
prospects to potential investors (Stiglitz, 1981). 
  Literature on finance presents three different forms of informational efficiency 
in stock market: weak-form, semi-strong form, and strong form based on set of 
information φt reflected in security prices (Fama, 1970; Jensen, 1978). In the weak 
form, the information set φt is taken to be solely the information contained in the 
past price history of the market as of time t whereas in the semi-strong form φt is 
taken to be all information that is publicly available at time t such as published 
financial data about companies, government data about economy earning estimates 
disseminated by companies and security analysis and so on (This includes the past 
history of prices so that the weak form is just a restricted version of this).Finally, in 
a strong form φt is taken to be all information known to anyone at time t including 
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even insider information such as imminent corporate takeover plans and 
extraordinary positive and negative future earning announcements. 
  The growth in the amount of data and computing power available to 
researchers, along with the growth in the number of active empirical researchers in 
finance since Fama’s (1970) paper has created an explosion of findings that raise 
questions about the efficient capital markets (Schweret, 2002). These findings are 




  Calendar anomalies include the calendar or seasonal regularities such as the 
month-of-the year effect, day-of-the-week effect, holiday effect, half-month effect, 
turn-of-the-month effect and time-of-the-month effect
6. Interestingly, these are not 
only observed in stock returns, but also in various financial markets such as money, 
derivative and commodities markets. The existence of these seems to be 
inconsistent with maintained theories of asset-pricing behavior. They indicate 
either market inefficiency (profit opportunities) or inadequacies in the underlying 
asset-pricing model. However, after they are documented and analyzed in the 
academic literature, they often seem to disappear, reverse, or attenuate. Thus, there 
are growing skepticisms on the study providing the evidence of anomalies
7.  
  First, calendar effects could be a result of data mining. Even if there are no 
calendar specific anomalies, an extensive search (mining)
8 over a large number of 
possible calendar effects is likely to yield something that appears to be an 
“anomaly” by pure chance. Moreover, Merton (1987) points out that “economists 
place a premium on the discovery of puzzles, which in the context at hand amounts 
to finding apparent rejections of a widely accepted theory of stock market 
behavior” (cited by Sullivan, Timmerman & White,1998). Another observation that 
points to data mining as a plausible explanation is that theoretical explanations 
have only been suggested after the empirical “discovery” of the anomalies.  
  The second is the data-snooping phenomenon
9, an attempt to detect regularities 
by many academicians and investors focusing on common stock price indexes 
(more severe for US markets). Data snooping imparts a “bias” in the sense that it 
affects inferences in an undesirable way (Lo & MacKinlay, 1990). 
  Thus, the findings of systematic seasonal patterns in stock returns leave us with 
a conundrum: do the apparent regularities in stock returns really imply a rejection 
of simple notions of market efficiency, or are they just a result of a large, collective 
data-snooping exercise? Many researchers express awareness of this problem. 
Lakonishok and Smidt (1988), for example, comment on the seasonal regularities 
in this way: “However, it is at least possible that these new facts are really 
chimeras, the product of sampling error and data mining”. Grouped by calendar 




  This effect states that return on common stock is not the same for all the 
months of the year. Empirical studies conducted in the stock market of US have 
found that the statistically significant positive returns to common stocks occur in 
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Timmerman and White (1998); Schweret (2002); Sar (2003); Hansen and Lunde (2005) for 
excellent review on anomalies. 
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January while significant negative returns to common stocks occur in December. 
Thus, the January effect is of phenomenon in these countries. 
  Wachtel provides the earliest evidence of the abnormal stock returns in January 
in 1942 for US stock markets. Rozeff and Kinney (1976) make the first formal 
investigation on the phenomenon, and find that returns on an equally weighted 
index of NYSE stocks were much higher in January than in other months of the 
year. Banz (1981) and Reinganum (1981) both provide report of a significant 
negative relationship between stock returns and the size of the issuing firm as 
measured by the total market value of outstanding equity. Keim (1983) investigates 
the interaction of the seasonal and size effects and finds that approximately half of 
the annual difference between the rates of return on small and large firms occurs in 
the month of January. Blume and Stambaugh (1983) apply a correction for the 
return measurement bias that results from using reported closing prices and shows 
virtually that all of the size effect occurs in the month of January. Various 
hypotheses (Chen & Singal, 2001) have been formulated to explain the anomaly of 
January effect. We provide a brief description of these and also the empirical study 
on it. 
 
Tax-Loss Selling hypothesis 
 
  This hypothesis was first suggested by Branch (1977). According to it, 
investors, wanting to realize capital losses in current tax year, create a downward 
price pressure at the year end (December) on securities that have previously 
experienced negative return. Subsequently, at the beginning of the new tax year 
(January), this selling pressure is relieved and the affected securities earn excess 
return as their prices rebound. Furthermore, because small firms’ stock returns are 
more volatile than large firms’ returns, small-firm stocks are more likely to have 
generated usable tax losses and therefore be candidates for tax loss selling (Brauer 
& Chang, 1990). Evidence in support of this hypothesis is provided by Jones, Lee 
and Apenbrink (1991); Poterba and Weisbenner (2001); Chen and Singal (2001); 
Dai (2003). Contradicting evidences are also abundant. Brown et. al (1983) in 
Australia and Kato and Schallheim (1985) in Japan report significant January 
effects, even though January is not the beginning of the tax year.  
 
The Window-dressing Hypothesis 
 
  According to the window-dressing hypothesis, developed by Haugen and 
Lakonishok (1988), institutional managers are evaluated based on their 
performance and their investment philosophy. To improve their performance, the 
institutions buy both risky stocks and small stocks but sell them before the end of 
the year so that they do not show up in their year-end holdings. At the beginning of 
the following calendar year (in January), investment managers reverse the process 
by selling winners, large stocks, and low risk stocks while replacing them with 
small and risky stocks that typically include many past losers. 
  The window dressing hypothesis represents an alternative but not necessarily 
mutually explanation for the month-of-the-year effect (January effect). However, 
the two hypothesis are difficult to differentiate because they both rely on year-end 
selling pressure in losing stocks, and both predict a January effect concentrated at 
the turn of the year. One difference is that the tax-loss selling hypothesis implies no 







Differential Information Hypothesis (Information Release Hypothesis)   5
 
  This hypothesis relies on how variation in the quantity of information available 
for different firms may result in different returns or levels of risk. According to 
Rozeff and Kinney (1976), the excess January returns are the effect of significant 
information releases that occur in the first few days of January. Barry and Brown 
(1985) report that relatively information-poor securities have more systematic risk 
than their information-rich counterparts. Suppose, in addition, small-capitalization 
stocks are information-poor while large capitalization stocks are information-rich. 
The surfeit of news associated with year-end reporting would increase the 
information richness of small stocks by relatively much more than it would that of 
the already informationally affluent large stocks. Consequently, small stocks would 
react more strongly to the increased news of January by generating larger returns 
than large stocks. Penman (1987) hypothesizes that firms release good news as 
soon as possible, towards the beginning of each quarter. But, they delay release of 
bad news to the second half of the quarter. According to him, if the market reacts 
mechanically to news, then stocks should earn abnormal returns in the first few 
days of each quarter. He finds support for this hypothesis by observing the release 
of good news at the beginning of quarters 2 to 4. However, he finds a weaker effect 
for the 1st quarter that includes January. Clarkson and Thompson (1988) report 
evidence corroborating risk reductions in response to information increases. Arbel 
and Strebel (1982) indicate that small-capitalization stocks tend not to be heavily 
researched by security analysts. 
 
Market Microstructure Biases 
 
  Market microstructure biases are most likely to plague stocks with low prices 
and low capitalization, exactly the type that meet the criteria for tax-loss selling. 
Researchers have shown that market microstructure biases (bid-ask bounce, bid-ask 
spreads) might explain the January effect and that transaction costs make it non 
tradable. Ball, Kothari, and Shanken (1995) suggest that low priced stocks trading 
within a relatively wide bid-ask interval may explain the effect. Cox and Johnston 
(1998) show that stocks with prices greater than $10 do not exhibit positive returns 
in January. Bharadwaj and Brooks (1992) also find that it is a low price effect.  
 
Evidence from Foreign Markets 
 
  The tax-loss explanation of the January effect has been challenged by studies 
of foreign stock markets where the January effect is observed though the host 
countries may not have a December-end tax year (Agrawal and Tandon, 1994). 
Brown et al. (1983) study Australian stocks where the tax year-end is June 30. 
They find seasonals in December-January and July-August with the largest effects 
in January and July. Berges, McConnell, and Schlarbaum (1984) study the 
Canadian stocks where December is the tax year-end. They find a January seasonal 
prior to 1972 when Canada had no capital gains tax. One explanation for the 
existence of a January effect in countries without December-end tax year is that 
foreign investors induce a January seasonal in those countries. If investors from 
countries with a December-end tax year have significant equity holdings in foreign 
countries then the January seasonal would be observed due to trading by those 
investors.  
  Few studies also reveal the presence of month-of-the-year effect of stock 
returns for other countries’ markets. Nassir and Mohammad (1987) provide 
evidence of Malaysia where the average January returns were significantly positive 
and higher than in other months during the period 1970-1986. Balaban (1995) 
reports January effect for Turkey although it does not have any capital gain tax. 
Furthermore, Ho (1999), using daily returns for the period January 1975 to 
November 1987, find that six out of eight emerging Asian Pacific stock markets 
exhibit significantly higher daily returns in January than in other months. Fountas   6
and Segerdakis (1999) test for seasonal effects in stock returns (the January effect 
anomaly) using monthly stock returns in eighteen emerging stock markets for the 
period 1987-1995. They find very little evidence in favor of this effect in the 
emerging markets. Pandey (2002) also reports the existence of January effect for 
India although January is not the first-month of tax year. Maghayereh (2003) find 
no evidence of monthly seasonality as well as January effect in the Amman Stock 
Exchange (Jordan). However, K.C. and Joshi (2004) find October effect for 




  The day-of-the-week effect (also called as weekend effect or Monday effect) 
indicates that the average daily return of the market is not the same for all the days 
of the week, as we would expect on the basis of the efficient market theory. 
Empirical studies conducted in the stock market of US, England and Canada have 
found that the statistically significant positive returns to common stocks occurs on 
Fridays while  significant negative returns to common stocks on Mondays but for 
Japan, France, Australia and Singapore, the significant negative returns appear on 
Tuesdays. Other studies also show the day of week effect for the emerging 
markets. Two hypotheses have been formulated by many researchers in trying to 
explain the day of the week anomaly: 
 (a)  The Calendar Time Hypothesis: According to this hypothesis, the return 
generating process is continuous. This means that Monday’s average return will be 
different than the other days’ average returns. The reason for this is that Monday’s 
average return is estimated from the closing price on Friday until the closing price 
on Monday. Hence, Monday’s average return will be three times higher than the 
average returns of the other working days (French, 1980; Lakonishok & Levi, 
1982). 
 (b)  The Trading Time Hypothesis: According to this hypothesis, the returns of 
common shares are generated during a transaction. This means that the average 
return of shares will be the same for all the weekdays (Monday through Friday), 
because each day’s return represents one day’s investment (French, 1980; 
Lakonishok & Levi, 1982). 
  The existence of weekend effect is considered to be inconsistent with the 
calendar time hypothesis and the trading time hypothesis (Sar, 2003). 
  Cross (1973) and French (1980) provide the earliest evidence of the weekend 
effect in US stock markets. Spawned by the work of them, numerous studies 
searched for satisfactory explanations to rationalize such puzzling discovery of the 
persistent negative Monday (or weekend) returns. 
  Lakonishok and Levi (1982) attribute the effect to the delay between trading 
and settlement in stocks and in clearing check which states that effect of delay in 
payments on expected measured rates of return of stock due to holidays and normal 
weekends causes lower return on Monday. Keim and Stambaugh (1984) introduce 
the bid-ask-spread bias as a possible explanation for the effect. Gibbons and Hess 
(1981) and Rogalski (1984) on the other hand introduce measurement error as an 
explanation. Liano and Gup (1989) report that Monday return patterns tend to be 
dissimilar in different stages of the business cycle. They find stronger negative 
Monday returns during economic contractions than during economic expansions. 
Barone (1989) finds that the largest drop in stock prices occur on the first two days 
of the week and are more pronounced on Tuesday in Italy. Damodaran (1989) 
concludes that earnings and dividend announcements on Fridays are much more 
likely to contain reports of declines and to be associated with negative abnormal 
returns than those on other weekdays. While Friday reports elicit negative average 
returns for firms in all size classes, announcements by smaller firms have more 
negative returns associated with them on the following trading day, suggesting that 
they are more likely to release reports after close of trading or that prices adjust 
more slowly to the information in these reports. In addition, he finds that a   7
comparison of the average returns by weekday, with and without the Friday 
announcements explains a surprisingly small proportion (3.4 percent) of the 
weekend effect. 
  Lakonishok and Maberly (1990), Sias and Starks (1995) and Kamara (1995) 
document that trading behavior, especially selling activity, tends to increase trading 
activity on Mondays. Sias and Starks (1995) report that the weekend effect returns 
and volume patterns are more pronounced in securities in which institutional 
investors play a great role. Kamara (1995) assumes that increased institutional 
trading activity is responsible for the Monday seasonal returns. Wang, Li and 
Erickson (1997) report that the day-of-the-week effect occurs primarily in the last 
two weeks (fourth and fifth weeks) of the month. They provide two possible 
explanations for this. The first explanation is based on the correlation between the 
Friday return and the Monday return. The second explanation relates negative 
Monday return to the expiry date of stock options.  Draper and Paudyal (2002) 
report for UK that Monday effect is caused by a combination of various factors, 
especially the fortnight of the month, account settlement day, ex dividend day, 
arrival of (bad) news on Fridays, trading activity and bid-ask spread. Further when 
these factors are controlled, the average Monday return becomes insignificantly 
different from the average return of other days of the week thus providing support 
for the trading time hypothesis. Katerina, Demeteres, George (2002) find negative 
returns for Greek on Thursdays instead of Mondays or Tuesdays as it has been 
observed in most of the other markets. Brus, Liu and Schulman (2003) report that 
the Monday returns patterns are different between the pre-and post-1988 sub-
periods. In other words, ‘traditional’ weekend effect documented in the previous 
studies has been reversed. They find that Monday returns tend to be positive and 
greater than the returns on other days of the week in the post-1988 period. 
However, they show similar Monday returns pattern between broad indices and 
industry indices (i.e., the ‘traditional’ and the ‘reverse’ weekend effects were 
observed for broad stock indices as well as in most industry indices). Further they 
observe that the similarity in Monday returns between broad stock indices and 
industry indices still persists after classifying the data by month of the year and by 
week of the month. From these results they suggest that the sources behind the 
weekend effect (traditional and reverse) are economic events that affect all sectors 
of the economy rather than industry-specific factors that impact on only a few 
industries. Chen and Singal (2003) show that unhedged speculative short sellers (as 
distinct from hedged short sellers) are partly responsible for the weekend effect. 
Empirical study for other markets show that day-of-the-week-effect also exists for 
Istanbul Stock Exchange (Balaban, 1995), Shanghai Composite Index (Zhou, 2003) 
and Amsterdam Stock Exchange (Sar, 2003). Agrawal and Tandon (1994) report 
evidence of a weekend effect in stock returns in nine countries. Choudhary (2000) 
reports the day-of-the-week effect for seven emerging Asian stock markets (India, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan and Thailand). Tong (2000) 
examined twenty-three equity market indices and find that the negative Friday is, 




  The consistency of the pattern around the weekend closing suggests that it may 
apply to any gap in trading. Empirical studies in US and other countries have 
reported high rates of return before holidays. For example, Roll (1983) observe 
high rates of return on the last trading day of December and Lakonishok and Smidt 
(1988) report high rates of return around Christmas. Ariel (1985) finds pre-holiday 
daily rates of return of 0.53 percent and 0.36 percent for the Center for Research in 
Security Prices (CRSP) equal-weighted index and value-weighted index, 
respectively, for the period 1963 to 1982. He reports that for the value-weighted 
index, the eight holidays per year account for 38 percent of the total annual rate of 
return (cited by Lakonishok & Smidt, 1988). Lakonishok & Smidt define a holiday   8
as a day when trading would normally have occurred but did not. Further, the days 
are classified as pre-holiday, post-holiday, or regular (neither) without regard to the 
day of the week. Pre-holidays are those days which have at least one preceding day 
as trading day, but at least one succeeding day as holiday. Post-holidays include 
those days which have at least one preceding day as holiday, but at least one 
succeeding day as trading day. Using Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) of 
ninety years data they find that the pre-holiday rate of return is 23 times larger than 
the regular daily rate of return, and holidays account for about 50 percent of the 
price increase in the DJIA. 
  Researchers have provided three main explanations for the existence of holiday 
effect (Meneu & Pardo, 2003).The first one is the existence of a relationship 
between this effect and other calendar anomalies. Lakonishok and Smidt (1988), 
Ariel (1990) and Liano et al. (1992) are among the first researchers to attempt to 
explain the holiday effect by appealing to other calendar anomalies such as the 
day-of-the–week effect, the monthly effect and the turn-of-the-year effect. Their 
results indicate that the high returns observed on pre-holidays are not a 
manifestation of other calendar anomalies (cited in Joshi, 2004).  
  Another explanation is based on the existence of a link between the pre-holiday 
effect and the small firm effect. Pettengill (1989) reports that small firms 
outperform large ones on both January and non-January pre-holidays but Ariel 
(1990) and Kim and Park (1994), on the contrary, find that, after controlling for the 
day-of-the-week effect and the pre-New-Year’s-Day effect, the size effect is not 
present in mean returns on pre-holidays( cited in Meneu and Pardo,2003).  
  The last explanation of the pre-holiday effect is based on a set of different and 
systematic trading patterns. Keim (1983 suggests that the pre-holiday return may 
be, in part, due to movements from the bid to the ask price. Ariel  points out that 
pre-holiday strength can be attributed to short-sellers who desire to close short but 
not long positions in advance of holidays or, simply, to some clientele which 
preferentially buys (or avoids selling) on pre-holidays. Meneu and Pardo (2003) 
observe that the pre-holiday effect for Spanish Stock Exchange could be due to the 
reluctance of small investors to buy on pre-holidays, which produces an increase in 
the average size of bid orders. 
  Other studies that provide the evidence of holiday effects include Barone 
(1989) for Italian Stock market; Cadsby and Ratner (1992) for Canada, Japan, 
Australia and Hong Kong but not for the European markets; and Jaleel  (2003) for 
Sri Lanka (cited in Joshi, 2004). 
 
Half-Month (HM) Effect 
 
  The tendency of common stock returns for the second half-month to be 
significantly below the first half of calendar month is labeled as the half-month 
effect (also called as semi- month effect). With regard to the first-half-month and 
second-half-month, there are two lines of accepted definition. Ariel’s (1987) 
definition of the first part of the month includes the last trading day of the previous 
month to the first eight trading days of the month, a total of nine trading days, 
while the last half of the trading month consists of nine trading days before the last 
trading day of the month. Using the CRSP value-weighted stock indices over the 
period 1963-1981, he reports an average rate of return of 0.826 percent for the 
value-weighted CRSP Index during the first part of the month and a negative 
average rate of return, -0.182 percent, during the second part of the month, i.e., 
positive rates of return occur in the stock market only during the first half of each 
month (cited in Lakonishok & Smidt, 1988). Lakonishok and Smidt (1988) define 
the first-half-of-the-month as the first through the fifteenth calendar day of the 
month, if it is a trading day, or if not, through the next trading day. The last-half-of-
the-month consists of the remaining days. They provide only mild support for the 
idea that rates of return are larger in the first-half –of-the-month than in the last-
half. Further they report that Ariel’s evidence of a higher average rate of return   9
during the first-half-of-the-month appears to be partly the result of idiosyncratic 
characteristics of the period he studied and partly the result of including the last 
trading day of the previous month as part of the first-half –of-the-month.  
  Jaffe and Westerfield (1989) find half-month effect for Australia and inverted 
half-month effect for Japan but no existence of effect for Canada and the United 
Kingdom. Liano, et al. (1992) report that economic cycles have impact on the half-
month effect in over-the-counter (OTC) stocks during the period 1973-1989, in that 
the half-month effect only existed in the periods of economic expansion but not 
during periods of economic contractions. Wong (1995) further extends the study to 
five developing stock markets of Hong Kong, Taiwan, Thailand, Malaysia and 
Singapore. There is no such effect in Singapore, Malaysia, Hong Kong and 
Taiwan. Thailand exhibited a reverse half-month effect in the second period but no 
half-month effect in the first and third periods. Boudreaux (1995) investigate the 
half-month effect in the stock markets of seven countries, namely, Denmark, 
France, Germany, Norway, Singapore/Malaysia, Spain and Switzerland .The half-
month effect is found in three countries, Denmark, Germany and Norway while a 
significantly inverted half-month effect is found in Singapore/Malaysia.  Balaban 
and Bulu (1996) do not find the half-month effect for Turkey whereas Mills, et al. 
(2000) find a half-month effect in Greece. Various explanatory factors, including 
pre-test bias, biased data, mismatch between calendar and trading time, dividend 
effect, manifestation of the January effect and small firms effect have been 
attributed to this.  
 
Turn-of-the-Month (TOM) Effect 
 
  This indicates that average daily rate of returns on common stock around the 
turn-of-the-month is different to that of average rate of return of remaining days of 
the calendar month. There are two accepted lines of definition regarding the turn-
of-the-month days. These include that of Ariel (1987) and Lakonishok and Smidt 
(1988). Ariel defines turn-of-the-month days to include the last trading day of the 
previous month and the first four trading days of the month. He analyzes the value 
weighted CRSP index for 19 years period (1963-1981) and provides some evidence 
that days around the turn-of-the-month (-1 to +4) exhibit a high rate of return. 
Lakonishok and Smidt (1988) include the last trading days of the previous month 
and only the first three trading days of the month. They find the TOM (-1 to +3) 
effect for Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA). Cadsby (1989) finds similar 
results for Canada.  Jaffe and Westerfield (1989) report the reverse TOM effect in 
Japanese Stock Market In a study of stock indices of 10 countries over different 
time periods until the late 1980s, Cadsby and Ratner (1992) report the TOM effect 
in U.S., Canada, Switzerland, West Germany ,United Kingdom and Australia but 
no such effect in Japan ,Hong Kong, Italy, and France. Agrawal and Tandon 
(1994), in their study of stock markets of eighteen countries also find evidence of 
the TOM effect internationally in the 1970s but fading effect in the decade of the 
1980s (cited in Joshi, 2004). 
   Others have also uncovered variations of the TOM period. Hensel and Ziemba 
(1996) utilize five days period inclusive of the last two trading days of the previous 
month, i.e., –2 and +3 in a study of turn-of-the-month pattern in U.S. stock market 
and Ziemba (1991) uses seven-day period inclusive of the last five trading days of 
the previous month in a study of turn-of-the-month pattern in Japan, i.e.,–5 to +2 
(cited by Compton, 2002). One of the hypotheses put forward to explain the TOM 
effect is liquidity trading—that is the demand of individual investors rises towards 
the end of the month in connection with the payment of salaries. Another 
hypothesis is portfolio rebalancing which says that institutional investors bunch 
their purchases at the end of the month because of the improvement this produces 
in the performances published in the specialized press as these are normally 
calculated on the basis of end-of-the-month price (Barone, 1989).  
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Time-of-the-Month Effect (Third Month Effect) 
 
  This monthly anomaly was first identified by Kohers and Patel (1999). They 
split a calendar month into three segments. The first segment extends from the 28th 
day of the previous month to the 7th day of the month, the second segment extends 
from the 8th day to the 17th day of the month and the last segment consists of the 
other days, that is, the 18th day to the 27th day of the month. Using the Standard & 
Poor’s Index during the period January 1960 - June 1995 and the NASDAQ Index 
during the period January 1972 - June 1995, they report that the returns are highest 
during the 'first third', experience a drop during the 'second third', and are lowest, 
and in most cases negative, during the 'last third' of a month. Further, they indicate 
that this pattern remained remarkably consistent for the two indices examined. It 
also held up well over the business cycles and many different sub periods tested. 
Lian (2002) studies this effect for six countries namely Australia, Malaysia, US, 
Hong Kong, Japan and Singapore. He reports that effect was a past phenomenon in 
Australia and Hong Kong but a recent phenomenon in the US. 
 
III. DATA SOURCE AND METHODOLOGY 
 
  The first part of this section describes Nepal Stock Exchange Index which is 
the basis for our study and second part describes the methodology used for the 
study. 
 
Nepal Stock Exchange (NEPSE) Index 
 
  The Nepal Stock Exchange Index is a value weighted index of all shares listed 
at the Nepal Stock Exchange and calculated once a day at the closing price. It is 
available on a daily basis from January 23, 1995 only, although Nepal Stock 
Exchange (NEPSE) opened its trading floor through licensed member on January 
13, 1994. Our sample period however, starts from February 1, 1995 and ends in 
December 31, 2004 covering approximately ten years. 
  The use of index provides a measure of general market trend (Keimp & Reid, 
1971) and is customarily justified by the statement that calendar anomalies are 
more easily detected in market indices or large stock portfolios than n individual 
share prices (Officer, 1975; Boudreaux, 1995; Pandey, 2002). Further it is more 
appropriate to use the daily index. Among the indexes, the value weighted index is 
preferable to the equally weighed index since the later places greater weight on 
small firms and potentially would magnify anomalies related to small firms 
(Pandey, 2002). 
  The NEPSE index is available for everyday when the market has been opened. 
Beginning on August 29, 1999, Sunday trading sessions were eliminated .The 
permanent elimination of Sunday trading sessions provides a convenient point for 
partitioning the data into sub periods. The first sub period starts from February 1, 
1995 to August 31, 1999 and the second covers the period from September 1, 1999 
to December 31, 2004 (hereafter indicated as pre-1999 & post-1999 respectively). 
  To facilitate making judgments about the persistence of characteristics of data 
we report the findings for the entire period (hereafter indicated as 1995-2004), pre-
1999 and post-1999 and in some cases for individual years.  
  With regard to the finding of anomalies, researchers are more concerned about 
data snooping phenomenon. A term used by Aldous (1989), it is the attempt to both 
discover and test hypotheses using the same data (cited in Lo et al., 1990). The 
statistical tests routinely used in financial economics are usually ineterpreted as if 
they were being applied to new data. But the data available in finance are seldom 
new. The dangers of data snooping are less in our case since only one study had 
been conducted utilizing nine years data.   
   11
Methodology 
 
  Daily logarithmetic returns on NEPSE were calculated from the NEPSE index 
for the period from February 1, 1995 to December 31, 2004 comprising of 2345 
trading days using the following equation. 
 
Rt =100* Ln (NEPSEt / NEPSEt-1) 
  
where Rt is the continuously compounded rate of change in the stock market index. 
NEPSEt is the stock market index at time t and NEPSEt-1is the stock market index 
at time t-1. Ln is the natural logarithm. First suggested by Osbrone (1959) , the 
lognormal probability distribution of price change is more popular and used by 
many other researchers (cited in Kemp & Reid,1971). We compute continuously 
the compounded returns, rather than arithmetic returns, because continuously 
compounded returns are additive and their distribution “follows” the normal 
distribution more closely than arithmetic returns (Lauterbach and Uncar, 1995). 
  To investigate the seasonal patterns, each return observation is coded according 
to its month relative to the year, day relative to the week, day relative to a holiday, 
day relative to the half-month, day relative to the turn-of-the-month, and day 
relative to the time-of-the-month Then each of recognized seasonal effects is tested 
individually, using regression equations with dummy variable(s). This type of 
model can have an admixture of qualitative (dummy) and quantitative variable or 
only qualitative variable as explanatory variable. We used the latter one.  
 
IV. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 
 
  This section consists of the analysis and findings related to various anomalies 




  Table 1 provides the mean, standard deviation, t-statistic (in parenthesis), 
percentage positive and number of months when the 119 mean monthly returns are 
categorized by the calendar months for 1995-2004 and for the four sub periods
10. 
One can see that the mean return for February and December is negative regardless 
of the periods considered. However, December is the only month with mean return 
significantly different from zero for post 1999 (mean=-0.1347 percent, t-statistic= -
2.35) and post-tax (mean= -0.1730 percent, t -statistic =-2.37).The negative and 
significant mean return observed for December is consistent to the U.S. markets. In 
contrast to this, we find that the mean return for June and October to be both 
positive for the entire period. The result for the sub-periods is consistent with that 
for the total period. Not surprisingly, the magnitude of the October mean return is 
greater for the entire period and three of the sub-periods, but only significant for 
the entire period (mean=0.2070 percent and t-statistic = 2.81) and pre-1999 
period(mean = 0.1978 percent, t -statistic = 2.87) and pre-tax period ( mean = 
0.2775 percent and t-statistic = 2.53) at conventional level of significance. The 
exception is post-tax period where April has the highest the insignificant 0.1803 
percent mean return (t- statistic=1.04). The higher and significant positive mean 
return observed for October is inconsistent to U.S. markets.  
                                                 
10 Sub-periods are based on the elimination of Sunday trading session and on the imposition 
of capital gain tax. Total sub periods are 2*2=4. The division of sub period on the basis of 
imposition of capital gain tax provides the explanation for the existence of the January 
effect in relation to tax-loss selling hypothesis.  
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Table 1: Summary Statistics for the Month-of-the-Year Effect in the Nepalese Stock Market 
 
 
Notes: a) Capital gain tax has been effective from July 17, 2001. But we used August 1, 2001 as a dividing line for sub periods pre-tax (February 2, 1995 to July31, 2001) and post-tax (August 1,2001 to December 
31,2004) .The rationale behind this is to avoid the appearance of July as a month in both sub periods. In addition to this we want to have uniform number of observations for each month of calendar year. The division 
of sub period on the basis of imposition of capital gain tax provides the explanation for the existence of the month-of- the- year effect in relation to tax-loss selling hypothesis.  
b) The data for this table are from the Trading Report of Securities Board, Nepal (SEBO/N) for the period 1995-2004 ( t-statistics are in parenthesis). From the daily return data we first compute the monthly arithmetic 
mean returns for each month of the calendar year. The summary statistics are then computed for all sub periods and for entire period. 
*  Significant at the 0.10 level for two-tailed test. 
**   Significant at the 0.05 level for a two tailed test. 
Period Jan  Feb  Mar  Apr  May  Jun  Jul  Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec  whole 
Pre-1999                                        
Mean  0.0478%  -0.0928%  0.0308% -0.1388% 0.0280% 0.0792% 0.0100% 0.0226% 0.0358% 0.1978% 0.0920% -0.1333% 0.0108% 
t-statistic  (1.19)  (-0.87)  (0.28) (-1.44) (0.29) (0.98) (0.14) (0.39) (0.35)  (2.87*)  (0.60) (-1.23) (0.39) 
Standard  Deviation  0.0805%  0.2377%  0.2453%  0.2149%  0.2188% 0.1815% 0.1581% 0.1297% 0.2041% 0.1376% 0.3051% 0.2162% 0.2042% 
Percentage Positive  75.00%  20.00%  60.00% 40.00% 40.00% 60.00% 40.00% 60.00% 50.00%  100.00%  25.00% 25.00% 50.00% 
Number of Months  4  5  5  5  5  5  5  5  4  4  4  4  54 
Post-1999                                        
Mean  -0.0168% -0.2606%  -0.0492% 0.1306% -0.0338%  -0.0296%  0.0256% 0.1296%  -0.0027%  0.2132% 0.0742% -0.1347% 0.0059% 
t-statistic  (-0.14)  (-0.82)  (-0.32)  (0.95)  (-0.32) (-0.40) (0.34) (0.53) (-0.03) (1.78) (0.92) (-2.35*) (0.15) 
Standard  Deviation  0.2615%  0.7073%  0.3485%  0.3082%  0.2347% 0.1674% 0.1687% 0.5474% 0.1896% 0.2935% 0.1974% 0.1404% 0.3246% 
Percentage Positive  80.00%  40.00%  100.00% 60.00%  40.00% 60.00% 60.00% 80.00% 66.67%  100.00%  50.00% 33.33% 64.06% 
Number of Months  5  5  5  5  5  5  5  5  6  6  6  6  64 
Pre-Tax
a                                        
Mean  0.0418%  -0.1621%  0.0853% -0.0831% -0.0490% 0.0249% 0.0227% 0.1725% 0.0808% 0.2775% 0.1543% -0.1082% 0.0331% 
t-statistic  (0.65)  (-0.76)  (1.00) (-0.83) (-0.55) (0.37) (0.36) (1.10) (0.98)  (2.53*)  (1.47) (-1.46) (1.02) 
Standard  Deviation  0.1580%  0.5627%  0.2252%  0.2646%  0.2376% 0.1768% 0.1670% 0.3851% 0.2029% 0.2684% 0.2576% 0.1815% 0.2877% 
Percentage Positive  33.33%  28.57%  42.86% 42.86%  42.86  14.29% 28.57% 66.67% 50.00% 83.33% 66.67% 16.67% 42.31% 
Number  of  months  6  7  7  7  7 7 7 6 6 6 6 6 78 
Post-Tax                                        
Mean  -0.0480% -0.2107%  -0.2297% 0.1803% 0.1047% 0.0247% 0.0063%  -0.0685%  -0.0895%  0.1013%  -0.0283%  -0.1730%  -0.0378% 
t-statistic  (-0.29)  (-0.82)  (-1.17)  (1.04)  (1.41)  (0.21) (0.07) (-0.37) (-1.71) (1.52) (-0.39)  (-2.37*)  (-1.00) 
Standard  Deviation  0.2840%  0.4433%  0.3389%  0.3002%  0.1285% 0.2073% 0.1526% 0.3714% 0.1046% 0.1331% 0.1448% 0.1461% 0.2420% 
Percentage Positive  33.33%  33.33%  33.33% 66.67%  100.00%  33.33% 33.33% 75.00% 25.00% 25.00% 50.00% 0.00% 46.34% 
Number of Months  3  3  3  3  3  3  3  4  4  4  4  4  41 
1995-2004                   
Mean  0.0119%  -0.1767 %  -0.0092 %  -0.0041%   -0.0029%   0.0248%   0.0178 %  0.0761 %  0.0127%   0.2070 %  0.0813 %  -0.1341%   0.0087%  
t-statistic  (0.18)  (-1.11)  (-0.10) (-0.05) (-0.04) (0.45) (0.36) (0.63) (0.22)  (2.81**)  (1.12)  (-2.60**)  (0.35) 
Standard  Deviation  0.1943%  0.5053%  0.2872%  0.2879%  0.2164% 0.1743% 0.1543% 0.3793% 0.1851% 0.2329% 0.2297% 0.1629% 0.2739% 
Percentage Positive  55.56%  30.00%  60.00% 50.00% 50.00% 40.00% 40.00% 70.00% 50.00% 90.00% 50.00% 20.00% 50.42% 






Table 2 Regression Coefficients for the Month-of-the-Year Effect in the Nepalese Stock Market 
 
 
Period  β0  β1  β2  β3  β4  β5  β6  β7  β8  β9  β10  β11  Adjusted 
R
2  F 
Pre-1999 0.0477%  -0.1406%  -0.0169%  -0.1866%  -0.0197%  0.0315%  -0.0377%  -0.0251%  -0.0120%  0.1500%  0.0443%  -0.1810% -0.03% 1.00 
    (0.47) (-1.03) (-0.12) (-1.37) (-0.15) (0.23) (-0.28) (-0.19)  (-0.08) (1.05)  (0.31)  (-1.26)       
Post-1999 -0.0168% -0.2438% -0.0324% 0.1474% -0.0170%  -0.0128% 0.0424%  0.1464% 0.0141% 0.2300%  0.0910%  -0.1179%  -3.85%  0.79 
    (-0.11) (-1.17) (-0.15) (0.70) (-0.08)  (-0.06) (0.20)  (0.70) (0.07) (1.15)  (0.45)  (-0.59)       
Pre-Tax 0.0418%  -0.2040%  0.0435%  -0.1250%  -0.0908%  -0.0170%  -0.0191%  0.1307%  0.0390%  0.2357% 0.1125% -0.1500% 3.95% 1.29 
   (0.36)  (-1.30)  (0.28)  (-0.80)  (-0.58)  (-0.11)  (-0.12)  (0.80)  (0.24)  (1.45)  (0.69)  (-0.92)      
Post-Tax -0.0480%  -0.1627%  -0.1817% 0.2283% 0.1527% 0.0727% 0.0543% -0.0205%  -0.0415%  0.1493%  0.0198%  -0.1250% -3.39% 0.88 
   (-0.34)  (-0.81)  (-0.90)  (1.14)  (0.76)  (0.36)  (0.27)  (-0.11)  (-0.22)  (0.79)  (0.11)  (-0.66)      
1995-2004 0.0119% -0.1886% -0.0211% -0.0160% -0.0148% 0.0129%  0.0059%  0.0642% 0.0008% 0.1951%  0.0694%  -0.1460%  2.79%  1.31 
   (0.13) (-1.52) (-0.17)  (-0.13)  (-0.12) (0.10) (0.05) (0.52) (0.01) (1.57)  (0.56)  (-1.18)      
 
Note: The data for this table are from the Trading Report of Securities Board, Nepal (SEBO/N) for the period 1995 to 2004 ( t-statistics are in parenthesis).  
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With regard to the other months, we find no specialty. Table 1 also reports that there does not exist 
risk return relationship for any of the calendar months of the year irrespective of the periods 
considered; for example, standard deviation of mean stock return for February is highest for most 
of the period under study (except pre-1999) whereas average return for that month is negative for 
all period. 
  To make a further test of the effect, the following regression equation with dummies is carried 
out (Pandey, 2002; Maghayereh, 2003) 
 
    Rt=β0+ β1d2t+ β2d3t+ β3d4t+ β4d5t+ --------+ β11d12t+ εt 
 
where, Rt is the mean return of the stock index on month t. The variable dit takes a value of one if 
the return occurs on i month and zero if the return occurs on the month other than i month (d2t 
=February, d3t =March, d4t =April, d5t =May, d6t =June, d7t =July, d8t =August, d9t =September, d10t 
=October, d11t =November, d12t =December). From basic econometrics we know that the 
coefficient β0 measures the mean return for January and the coefficients β1 through β11 measure the 
difference between the mean return for each month of the year and the mean return for January. εt 
is the error term. The regression model is tested for the null hypothesis H0: β1= β2= β3= β4= ------
β11= 0 against the alternative hypothesis that mean return for each month of the year is not equal. 
The significance of coefficient of at least one dummy variable confirms that there is no equality of 
mean returns across the calendar months of the year. This approach is equivalent to regressing the 
returns on twelve monthly dummies, with no constant term, and testing for the equality of all 
parameters. 
 
  Table 2 reports the regression results for the entire period and sub periods. The results support 
our null hypothesis that the mean returns for each month of calendar year are equal. The 
coefficient of dummy variable d10t (β9) is higher and insignificantly different from zero for all 
periods at conventional level of significance. The intercept term β0 indicating the mean return for 
January reverses in sign for pre and post sub periods. More important, the difference between the 
returns for December and January represented by β11 are negative and insignificant for all of the 
periods considered. These regression outputs reveal no discernable month-of-the-year anomaly 
(and January effect hypothesis). This implies that the average return in January does not 
significantly exceed the average return over the rest of the year. Our results also suggest that there 
is no difference in returns across months. These results are consistent to that obtained for the 
emerging market, namely, Jordan (Maghayereh, 2003). 
 
Day- of- the-Week Effect 
 
  Table 3 provides the mean, standard deviation, t-statistic (in parenthesis), percentage positive and 
number of months when the 2,344 daily returns are categorized by the day-of – the-week  for 
1995-2004 , two sub periods and for individual years. The results indicate that for the full sample 
period the average Sunday return (mean= 0.0802 percent, t statistic =1.81) is significant at 10 
percent level of significance. The pattern for this day remains similar for sub-period of pre-1999
11. 
Probably, this is because of the elimination of Sunday trading sessions. In contrast to this, we find 
no significant mean return for any days of week for sub period of post-1999. On an individual year 
basis, we find that all days are significant (level of significance differs) at least once. More 
important, our results also remain consistent with that of total period results but the average return 
is significant only for year 1999 (mean=0.2602 percent , t statistic =2.18).In addition we also 
observe that Wednesday and Thursday follow a identical pattern as is Monday and Tuesday for 
most of the period. The exception is year 1997 and 2004 for the former and 1995, 1998 and 2002 
for the latter. Friday , the day for which abnormal returns are observed in international market 
                                                 
11 Sunday is the first trading day for pre-1999 period.   15
provides no consistent results in our case
12.One can also see that when Monday is the first trading 
day of the week it is significantly positive but when it is second day of trading sessions it is 
significantly negative. Accordingly, when Thursday is the last trading day it is insignificant at 
conventional level of significance but when it is the second last day of trading session it is 
significantly different from zero for 2000 (mean=0.4018 percent, t-statistic=4.11), 2001(mean=-
0.3140 percent, t-statistic=-1.87) and 2002 (mean=-0.4633 percent , t-statistic=-3.14). Table 3 also 
indicates that risk is not sufficient to explain low returns of Thursday. 
 
Table 3 
Summary Statistics for the Day-of-the-Week Effect in the Nepalese Stock Market 
 
Period Sun  Mon  Tue  Wed  Thu  Fri  All  Days 
1995         
Mean  -0.1003% 0.0020%  -0.0535% 0.1099% 0.0879%     0.0093% 
t-statistic  (-0.93) (0.02)  (-0.59) (1.01) (0.55)     (0.18) 
Standard Deviation  0.7091%  0.7590%  0.5949% 0.7315% 0.9777%     0.7554% 
Percentage  Positive  41.86% 42.86% 51.16% 46.67% 57.89%     47.87% 
Number  of  Observations  43 42 43 45 38      211 
1996         
Mean  0.0931% -0.1680% -0.0132% -0.0915% -0.1095%     -0.0569% 
t-statistic  (1.44)  (-2.76**) (-0.21)  (-1.83*) (-1.54)      (-2.03**) 
Standard Deviation  0.4541%  0.4256%  0.4300% 0.3505% 0.4716%     0.4335% 
Percentage  Positive  51.02% 32.65% 50.00% 42.86% 38.64%     43.10% 
Number  of  Observations  49 49 48 49 44      239 
1997         
Mean  0.0869% -0.0610% -0.1110%  0.0918% -0.0757%     -0.0143% 
t-statistic  (1.19) (-0.77) (-0.94)  (1.39) (-0.75)     (-0.35) 
Standard Deviation  0.5007%  0.5291%  0.8178% 0.4470% 0.6953%     0.6167% 
Percentage  Positive  55.32% 35.56% 37.50% 58.70% 51.06%     47.64% 
Number  of  Observations  47 45 48 46 47      233 
1998         
Mean  0.1070%  -0.1206% 0.0896% 0.0035% 0.0880%     0.0333% 
t-statistic  (0.85)  (-0.82) (1.45) (0.02) (1.21)     (0.59) 
Standard Deviation  0.8528%  1.0021%  0.4251% 1.2311% 0.4927%     0.8581% 
Percentage  Positive  69.57% 56.52% 61.70% 65.31% 60.87%     62.82% 
Number  of  Observations  46 46 47 49 46      234 
1999         
Mean  0.2602% 0.1871% 0.1084% 0.2022% 0.0823% 0.3348% 0.1720% 
t-statistic  (2.18**)  (2.40**) (1.24)  (2.07**) (0.92)  (4.33**)  (4.39**) 
Standard  Deviation  0.6659% 0.5351% 0.5980% 0.6696% 0.6229% 0.2998% 0.6003% 
Percentage  Positive  70.97% 70.21% 63.83% 68.09% 66.67% 80.00% 68.51% 
Number  of  Observations  31 47 47 47 48 15  235 
2000         
Mean     0.2948% 0.1878% 0.1180% 0.4108% 0.3003% 0.2627% 
t-statistic     (2.17) (1.10) (0.70)  (4.11**)  (2.32**)  (4.11**) 
Standard Deviation     0.9711%  1.1612% 1.1469% 0.6703% 0.8949% 0.9823% 
Percentage Positive     56.86%  63.04%  54.35%  77.78%  64.58%  58.90% 
Number  of  Observations     51 46 46 45 48  236 
2001           
Mean     -0.1676% -0.2609% -0.4998% -0.3140% -0.0086% -0.2512% 
t-statistic      (-1.02) (-1.84*)  (-2.53**) (-1.87*)  (-0.06)  (-3.38**) 
Standard Deviation     0.3128%  0.0715% 0.0148% 0.0682% 0.9554% 1.1405% 
Percentage Positive     43.48%  40.00%  41.67%  35.56%  51.06%  42.37% 
Number  of  Observations     46 50 48 45 47  236 
2002           
Mean     -0.0904%  0.2387%  -0.1093%  -0.4633%  -0.1463%  -0.1163% 
t-statistic     (-0.78)  (1.46)  (-0.69)  (-3.14**)  -0.91  (-1.72*) 
Standard Deviation     0.8153%  1.1057% 1.1117% 1.0232% 1.0677% 1.0431% 
Percentage Positive     34.00%  50.00%  53.06%  31.25%  38.64%  41.35% 
                                                 
12 Data record of SEBO/N does not provide NEPSE index for Friday preceding August 31, 1999, although 
odd lot trading occurs for that date. We therefore treat that day as non-trading day for the corresponding 
period. Hence the result for this day for full sample period and post 1999 period is identical. 
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Table 3 Continued 
 
 
Period Sun  Mon  Tue  Wed  Thu  Fri  All  Days 
Number  of  Observations     50 46 49 48 44  237 
2003          
Mean      0.0821% 0.0696% -0.0646%  -0.1113% -0.0048% -0.0065% 
t-statistic      (0.69) (0.57) (-1.14)  (-1.40) (-0.05) (-0.15) 
Standard deviation     0.8120%  0.8678%  0.4023%  0.5557%  0.6395%  0.6744% 
Percentage  Positive     46.81% 36.00% 38.00%  46.94% 42.86% 40.00% 
Number of Observations     47  50  50  49  49  245 
2004          
Mean     0.1560% 0.0430% 0.0467%  -0.0020% 0.1153% 0.0703% 
t-statistic     (2.06**)  (0.63)  (0.50)  (-0.02)  (1.79*)  (1.80) 
Standard deviation     0.0453%  0.5322%  0.6197%  0.9866%  0.0797%  0.6021% 
Percentage  Positive     63.04% 68.75% 57.14%  61.22% 58.70% 41.18% 
Number of Observations     46  48  49  49  46  238 
Pre-1999          
Mean 0.0802%  -0.0374%  -0.0105% 0.0489%  0.0091%     0.0183% 
t-statistic  (1.81*) (-0.79) (-0.26)  (0.94) (0.19)      (0.88) 
Standard deviation  0.6507%  0.6933%  0.6012% 0.7727%  0.6775%     0.6817% 
Percentage Positive  56.94%  46.73%  51.83%  55.45%  54.59%     53.12% 
Number of Observations  216  214  218  220  207     1075 
Post-1999          
Mean     0.0557% 0.0606%  -0.0824%  -0.0887% 0.0709% 0.0029% 
t-statistic     (1.03) (1.03)  (-1.34)  (-1.59) (1.34) (0.11) 
Standard deviation     0.8619%  0.9354%  0.9875%  0.8877%  0.8352%  0.9052% 
Percentage  Positive     49.41% 51.37% 50.78%  50.79% 53.41% 51.14% 
Number of Observations     255  255  258  252  249  1269 
1995-2004          
Mean  0.0802% 0.0132% 0.0278%  -0.0220%  -0.0446% 0.0709% 0.0100% 
t-statistic  (1.81*) (0.36) (0.76)  (-0.54)  (-1.19) (1.34) (0.60) 
Standard deviation  0.6507%  0.7900%  0.7989% 0.8965%  0.8004% 0.8352% 0.8103% 
Percentage  Positive  56.94% 48.19% 51.59% 52.93%  52.51% 53.41% 52.05% 
Number  of  Observations  216 469 473 478  459 249  2344 
 
Notes: (a)  The data for this table are from the Trading Report of Securities Board, Nepal (SEBO/N) for the period 1995-2004 ( t-
statistics are in parenthesis).  
  (b) Data record of SEBO/N does not provide NEPSE index for Friday preceding August 31, 1999, although odd lot trading 
occurs for that date. We therefore treat that day as non-trading day for corresponding period.  
*  Significant at the 0.10 level for two-tailed test. 
**   Significant at the 0.05 level for a two tailed test. 
 
To make a test of the effect, the following regression equation with dummies is carried out 
(French
13, 1980; Brus, Liu & Schulman, 2003; Galai & Levy, 2002). 
 
Rt=β0+ β1d2t+ β2d3t+ β3d4t+ β4d5t + β5d6t+ εt 
 
where, Rt is the mean return of the stock index on day t. 
  The variable dit takes a value of one if the return occurs on the i day and 0 if the return occurs 
on day other than i day (d2t =Monday, d3t =Tuesday, d4t =Wednesday, d5t =Thursday; for post 
1999, d2t =Tuesday, d3t =Wednesday, d4t =Thursday, d5t =Friday; for the entire period and year 
1999- d2t =Monday, d3t =Tuesday, d4t= Wednesday, d5t =Thursday, d6t =Friday). The coefficient β0 
measures the mean return for Sunday (for post-1999, mean return for Monday) and the coefficients 
β1 through β4 measure the difference between the mean return for each of the other days of the 
week and the mean return for Sunday (for post-1999, mean return for Monday). For entire period 
and year 1999, the coefficient β0 measures the mean return for Sunday and the coefficients β1 
through β5 measure the difference between the mean return for each of the other days of the week 
and the mean return for Sunday. εt is the error term.   
                                                 
13 We add extra dummy variable d6t to regression equation of that used in this study to take into account all 
trading days before and after elimination of Sunday trading sessions.    17
 
Table 4  
Regression Coefficients for Day-of-the-Week Effect in the Nepalese Stock Market 
   
Period  β0  β1  β2  β3  β4  β5 Adj.  R
2 F 
1995  -0.1003% 0.1023% 0.0469%  0.2102%  0.1882%       
  (-0.87) (0.62) (0.29)  (1.30)  (1.11)    -0.77% 0.60 
1996  0.0931% -0.2611% -0.1063%  -0.1846%  -0.2026%       
  (1.52) (-3.02**)  (-1.23)  (-2.14**)  (-2.28**)   2.79%  2.71** 
1997  0.0869% -0.1479% -0.1979% 0.0049%  -0.1626%       
  (0.97) (-1.15) (-1.57) (0.04)  (-1.28)    0.23%  1.14 
1998  0.1070% -0.2276% -0.0173%  -0.1034%  -0.0190%       
  (0.84) (-1.27) (-0.10)  (-0.58)  (-0.11)    -0.76%  0.56 
1999  0.2667% -0.0851% -0.1610%  -0.0645%  -0.2026%  0.0681%     
  (2.70**) (-0.64) (-1.21)  (-0.49)  (-1.51)  (0.37)  -0.38%  0.82 
2000   0.2948%  -0.1070%  -0.1768%  0.1160%  0.0055%     
   (2.14**)  (-0.53)  (-0.88)  (0.58)  (0.03)  -0.69%  0.60 
2001   -0.1676% -0.0934%  -0.3322%  -0.1465%  0.1729%     
   (-1.00) (-0.40)  (-1.41)  (-0.61)  (0.73)  0.42%  1.25 
2002   -0.0904%  0.3291%  -0.0189%  -0.3729%  -0.0559%     
   (-0.62)  (1.57)  (-0.09)  (-1.80*)  (-0.26)  2.89%  2.76** 
2003   0.0821%  -0.0125%  -0.1467%  -0.1934%  -0.0869%     
   (0.83)  (-0.09)  (-1.07)  (-1.40)  (-0.63)  -0.42% 0.75 
2004   0.1560%  -0.1130%  -0.1093%  -0.1580%  -0.0407%  -0.83%  0.51 
   (1.75*) (-0.91) (-0.88)  (-1.27)  (-0.32)     
Pre-1999  0.0802% -0.1176% -0.0907%  -0.0313%  -0.0711%    0.01%  1.02 
  (1.73*) (-1.79*)  (-1.39) (-0.48) (-1.07)       
Post-1999   0.0557% 0.0049%  -0.1381%  -0.1444%  0.0152% 0.33%  2.05* 
   (0.98) (0.06)  (-1.73)  (-1.80*)  (0.19)     
1995-2004  0.0802% -0.0670% -0.0524%  -0.1022%  -0.1248%  -0.0092%  0.05%  1.22 
  (1.45) (-1.01) (-0.79)  (-1.54)  (-1.87*)  (-0.12)     
 
Notes: The data for this table are from the Trading Report of Securities Board, Nepal (SEBO/N) for the period 1995-2004 ( t-  statistics 
are in parenthesis).  
*  Significant at the 0.10 level for two-tailed test 
**   Significant at the 0.05 level for a two tailed test.   
 
  The regression model is tested for the null hypothesis H0: β1= β2= β3= β4=β5= 0 against the 
alternative hypothesis that all returns for the weekdays are not equal. The significance of 
coefficient of at least one dummy variable confirms that there is existence of the day- of-the-week 
effect. This approach is equivalent to regressing the returns on six daily dummies, with no constant 
term, and testing for the equality of all parameters. 
  Table 4 reports the regression results for the day-of-the-week effect .The results do not support 
the null hypothesis. The coefficient of dummy variable d5t (β4) representing the difference between 
Thursday and Sunday returns, are significantly negative for the entire period at 10 percent level of 
significance. Interestingly, the magnitude of this coefficient is also highest .This pattern also 
remain consistent for the post 1999 period (but the coefficient now represents the difference 
between Thursday and Monday mean return). However for pre-1999, it is the coefficient of 
dummy variable d3t (β0) that possess this attribute. If individual years are considered we find no 
consistent pattern. In addition we find disappearing pattern of significant coefficients representing 
the differences between each day of the week and the benchmark day. 
  To summarize, our results indicate the day-of- the-week effect for full sample period, sub- 
periods and for some individual years. However, the pattern is different from the one observed in 
most other developed markets. Instead of negative returns on Mondays or even Tuesdays, we have 
negative returns on Thursdays
14 (significant), for full sample period and post-1999 sub period 
while for pre-1999 we observe negative return for Monday, as similar to international market 
                                                 
14 Katerina, Demetres, Komisopoulos (2002) also observe negative returns on Thursdays, last trading day of 
the week (but insignificant) for the Athens Stock market. 
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(when Sunday is the first trading day) but again the significant positive return observed for Sunday 
is inconsistent to that observed for other markets.  
 
          Holiday  Effect 
 
  Table 5 provides the descriptive statistics for stock returns on pre-holidays , post-holidays and 
regular  days as defined by Lakonishok and Smidt (1988).The average return for pre-holiday and 
regular day are insignificantly positive for the entire period (mean=0.0202 percent ,t statistics 
=0.29 and mean=0.0080 percent, t statistics =0.45 respectively).In contrast to this ,average post-
holidays return is  insignificant -0.0400 percent (t statistics=-0.51).Not surprisingly, the  pre-
holiday rate of return is greater than both regular day rate of return and post-holiday rate of return. 
This is consistent to that of Lakonishok and Smidt obtained for U.S. markets. But the magnitude is 
much lower than that observed for the U.S. market .For instance Lakonishok and Smidt (1988) 
observed that the pre- holiday rate of return is 23 times greater than the regular daily rate of return 
for the total sample period of ninety years. However we observe the magnitude to be three times
15 
for total sample period of ten years. The results for the sub periods are in general consistent with 
that for total period results. In addition holiday accounts for 53 percent rate of the increase in 
NEPSE index
16.Table 5 also reports that for year 2000 only rates of return around holidays (i.e., 
pre-holidays, post-holidays and regular days) are significant at conventional level of significance. 
This result does not remain stationary across other years. One can also find from Table 5 that a 
pre-holiday return is not a reward for bearing extra risk consistent to that obtained by Ariel (1990) 
.For example for full sample period standard deviation is greater for post holiday rate of return 
than that for pre-holiday rate of return. 
  Table 5 
Summary Statistics for the Holiday Effect in the Nepalese Stock Market 
 
Period Pre-holiday  Post-holiday  Regular  day 
1995     
Mean -0.0182%  0.1242%  -0.0260% 
t-statistic (-0.10)  (0.92)  (-0.41) 
Standard Deviation  0.8205%  0.6016%  0. 8215% 
Percentage Positive  45.00%  65.00%  46.20% 
Number of Observations  20  20  171 
1996     
Mean -0.1498%  -0.0184%  -0.0536% 
t-statistic (-2.01*)  (-0.15)  (-1.76*) 
Standard Deviation  0.2889%  0.4614%  0.4407% 
Percentage Positive  26.67%  60.00%  42.58% 
Number of Observations  15  15  209 
1997     
Mean -0.1072%  0.0827%  -0.0213% 
t-statistic (-0.81)  (0.40)  (-0.51) 
Standard Deviation  0.5614%  0.9073%  0.5891% 
Percentage Positive  55.56%  63.16%  44.90% 
Number of Observations
a 18  19  196 
1998     
Mean 0.1703%  -0.4062%  0.0321% 
t-statistic (1.41)  (-0.83)  (0.64) 
Standard Deviation  0.4821%  2.0118%  0.7075% 
Percentage Positive  62.50%  58.82%  62.19% 
Number of Observations  16  17  201 
                                                 
15 Lauterbach and Uncar (1995) also obtain the similar results for the  Israeli stock  market. 
16 Lakonishok and Smidt (1988) find that holiday accounts for about 50 percent of the price increase in Dow 
Jones Industrial Average.   19
Table 5 Continued 
Period Pre-holiday  Post-holiday  Regular  day 
1999     
Mean 0.3164%  0.1383%  0.1613% 
t-statistic (3.96**)  (1.60)  (3.59**) 
Standard Deviation  0.3388%  0.3675%  0.6344% 
Percentage Positive  83.33%  66.67%  66.83% 
Number of Observations  18  18  199 
2000     
Mean 0.8398%  0.7968%  0.2026% 
t-statistic (1.98*)  (2.45**)  (3.18**) 
Standard Deviation  1.4720%  1.0795%  0.9300% 
Percentage Positive  66.67%  81.82%  61.97% 
Number of Observations  12  11  213 
2001     
Mean -0.0911%  -0.4236%  -0.2463% 
t-statistic (-0.26)  (-1.71)  (-3.12**) 
Standard Deviation  1.3140%  0.9599%  1.1373% 
Percentage Positive  71.43%  33.33%  41.06% 
Number of Observations  14  15  207 
2002     
Mean -0.7824%  -0.4716%  -0.0330% 
t-statistic (-2.71**)  (-2.00*)  (-0.46) 
Standard Deviation  1.1920%  0.9452%  1.0163% 
Percentage Positive  29.41%  18.75%  44.12% 
Number of Observations  17  16  204 
2003     
Mean 0.2376%  0.1031%  -0.0262% 
t-statistic  (2.38**) (0.61)  (-0.56) 
Standard Deviation  0.3464%  0.6076%  0.6900% 
Percentage Positive  75.00%  46.15%  39.55% 
Number of Observations  12  13  220 
2004     
Mean 0.0621%  -0.1231%  0.0859% 
t-statistic  (0.77) (-0.82)  (2.00**) 
Standard deviation  0.3133%  0.6013%  0.6171% 
Percentage Positive  40%  37.5%  65.22% 
Number of Observations  15  16  207 
Pre-1999     
Mean 0.0192%  -0.0177%  0.0093% 
t-statistic  (0.03) (-0.36)  (0.53) 
Standard Deviation  0.5704%  1.0706%  0.6576% 
Percentage Positive  52.44%  60.71%  51.93% 
Number of Observations  82  84  909 
Post-1999     
Mean 0.0212%  -0.0647%  0.0069% 
t-statistic  (0.16) (-0.62)  (0.26) 
Standard deviation  1.1185%  0.9039%  0.8883% 
Percentage Positive  57.33%  44.74%  51.07% 
Number of Observations  75  76  1118 
1995-2004     
Mean 0.0202%  -0.0400%  0.0080% 
t-statistic  (0.2893) (-0.5101)  (0.4533) 
Standard deviation  0.8732%  0.9921%  0.7930% 
Percentage Positive  54.78%  53.13%  51.46% 
Number of Observations  157  160  2027 
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Note: The data for this table are from the Trading Report of Securities Board, Nepal (SEBO/N) for the period 1995-2004 
( t-statistics are in parenthesis).A holiday is a day when trading would normally have occurred but did not. For the 
pre-1999 period, these exclude Friday and Saturday and for post 1999 these exclude Saturday and Sunday. The 
days on which stock market strikes occur are also counted as holidays. Further, days are classified as pre-holidays, 
post-holidays and regular days  (neither) without regard to the day of the week Pre-holidays are those days which 
have at least one preceding day as trading day, but at least one succeeding day as holiday. Post-holidays are for 
those days which have at least one preceding day as holiday, but at least one succeeding day as trading day as 
defined by Lakonishok & Smidt (1988). 
a   The number of observations for the pre-holidays and number of post-holidays must equal the number of holidays. In 
our case, the number of pre-holidays are not equal to the number of the post-holidays (except for 1995 and 
1996).This is because, for some observations, the same day appears as pre-holidays as well as post-holidays.   
*  Significant at the 0.10 level for two-tailed test. 
**   Significant at the 0.05 level for a two tailed test. 
 
To make a further test of holiday effect the following regression equation with dummies is carried 
out (Lakonishok & Smidt, 1988, Joshi, 2004, Meneu & Pardo, 2003.). 
 
Rt=β0+ β1d2t+ β2d3t+ εt 
 
where Rt is the mean return of the stock index on day t and the dummy variable dit indicates the 
day on which the return is observed (d2t = post-holidays and d3t = regular days), and d2t attains a 
value of 1 if the return is observed on post-holidays, 0 otherwise. Similar remarks apply to d3t. 
From basic econometrics we know that the coefficient β0 measures the mean return for pre-holiday 
and the coefficients β1 and   β2 measure the difference between the mean returns for post-holiday 
and pre-holiday and regular day and pre-holiday. εt is the error term. The regression model is tested 
for the null hypothesis H0: β1= β2= 0 against the alternative hypothesis that average returns around 
holidays are not equal. The significant positive coefficient of at least one dummy variable confirms 
that there is existence of the holiday effect. This approach is equivalent to regressing the returns on 
three daily dummies, with no constant term, and testing for the equality of all parameter. 
 
Table 6 
Regression Coefficients for the Holiday Effect in the Nepalese Stock Market 
   
Period  β0  β1  β2 Adjusted    R
2 F  statistic 
-0.0182% 0.1424%  -0.0078%  1995 
(-0.10) (0.56)  (-0.04) 
-0.66% 0.31 
-0.1498% 0.1314%  0.0962%  1996 
(-1.34) (0.83)  (0.83) 
-0.50% 0.41 
-0.1072% 0.1899%  0.0859%  1997 
(-0.74) (0.93)  (0.56) 
-0.48% 0.44 
0.1702% -0.5765%  -0.1381%  1998 
(0.80) (-1.94**)  (-0.62) 
1.16% 2.37 
0.3164% -0.1781%  -0.1551%  1999 
(2.23) (-0.89)  (-1.05) 
-0.36% 0.58 
0.8398% -0.0429%  -0.6372%  2000 
(3.00**) (-0.11)  (-2.22**) 
2.66% 4.21** 
-0.0911% -0.3325%  -0.1552%  2001 
(-0.30) -(0.79)  (-0.49) 
-0.59% 0.31 
-0.7824% 0.3108%  0.7494%  2002 
(-3.15**) (0.87)  (2.90**) 
3.46% 5.23** 
0.2376% -0.1345%  -0.2638%  2003 
(1.22) (-0.50)  (-1.32) 
0.04% 1.05 
0.0621% -0.1853% 0.0237%  2004 
(0.40) (-0.86) (0.15) 
-0.09% 0.90 
0.0192% -0.0369%  -0.0099%  Pre-1999 
(0.25) (-0.34)  (-0.12) 
-0.17% 0.07   21
Continued Table 6 
 
Period  β0  β1  β2 Adjusted    R
2 F  statistic 
0.0212% -0.0859%  -0.0143%  Post-1999 
(0.20) (-0.58)  (-0.13) 
-0.12% 0.24 
0.0205% -0.0684%  -0.0125%  1995-2004 
(0.38) (-0.90)  (-0.22) 
-0.04% 0.54 
 
Note: The data for this table are from the Trading Report of Securities Board, Nepal (SEBO/N) for the period 1995-2004 ( t-statistics 
are in parenthesis)  
*  Significant at the 0.10 level for two-tailed test 
**   Significant at the 0.05 level for a two tailed test.   
 
  Table 6 reports the regression results for the holiday effect. The results support our null 
hypothesis for equality between the pre-holiday mean return, post-holiday mean return and the 
regular day mean return. The coefficients of dummy variables d2t and d3t are not significant at usual 
level of significance for the entire period. These results also holds for both of the sub periods and 
the majority of the individual years .The exception to this is 1998 where the coefficient of d2t 
representing the difference between post-holiday and pre-holiday rate of return is significantly 
negative at 5 percent level of significance and 2000 and 2002 for which the coefficient is 
significantly (negative for 2000 and positive for 2002) different from zero. In other words, we 
observe holiday effect for 1998 and 2000 but inverted holiday effect for 2002. 
  To summarize, our results indicate that pre-holiday rate of return is in general greater than 
post-holiday and regular day return (represented by coefficients β1 and β2) but statistically 
insignificant and inconsistent with that obtained for other developed markets for most of the 




  Table 7 reports the descriptive statistics for the stock returns during the first-half-of-the-month 
and second-half-of-the-month period as defined by Lakonishok and Smidt (1988). The results 
indicate that the average first-half-of-the-month (FHM) return is insignificant 0.0208 percent (t 
statistics =0.90) whereas average second-half-of-the-month (SHM) return is insignificant at -
0.0101 percent (t statistic= -0.41). Interestingly, the average daily return for the FHM is three 
times greater than the average daily return for the SHM. These results remain consistent regardless 
of the sub periods considered. When the entire period is spilt into years, we observe the mean 
FHM and SHM return to be positive and undistinguishable from zero in year 2000 and 2001. 
However for 1996 and 2002 (mean= -0.0728 percent, t-statistics = -2.10 and mean= -0.3653 
percent, t-statistics = -3.35, respectively) we find only the average SHM return to be significantly 
different from zero. In addition Table 7 reports significant FHM return only for 2003 (mean= -
0.1719 percent, t-statistics = -1.80). One can also see that higher return for FHM is not a reward 
for assuming risk.   
 
Table 7 







1995    
Mean 0.0412%  -0.0615% 
t-statistic  (0.450) (-1.04) 
Standard Deviation  0.9565%  0.5952% 
Percentage Positive  50.46%  45.10% 
Number of Observations  109  102 
1996    
Mean (-0.0422)  (-0.0728)   22







t-statistic  (-0.97) (-2.10**) 
Standard Deviation  0.4852%  0.3711% 
Percentage Positive  40.32%  46.09% 
Number of Observations  124  115 
1997    
Mean -0.0130%  -0.0262% 
t-statistic  (-0.20) (-0.55) 
Standard Deviation  0.7073%  0.5100 
Percentage Positive  50.00%  44.35% 
Number of Observations  118  115 
1998    
Mean 0.0710%  -0.0507% 
t-statistic  (1.35) (-0.51) 
Standard Deviation  0.5736%  1.0765% 
Percentage Positive  (63.03)  (61.74) 
Number of Observations  119  115 
1999    
Mean 0.1212  0.2239 
t-statistic  (2.60**) (3.53**) 
Standard Deviation  (0.5108)  (0.6799) 
Percentage Positive  65%  71.30% 
Number of Observations  120  115 
2000    
Mean 0.2746%  0.2512% 
t-statistic  (3.68**) (2.43**) 
Standard Deviation  0.8026%  1.1326% 
Percentage Positive  63.79  62.50% 
Number of Observations  116  120 
2001    
Mean -0.1390%  -0.3653% 
t-statistic  (-1.38) (-3.35**) 
Standard Deviation  1.0959%  1.1779% 
Percentage Positive  42.86%  41.88% 
Number of Observations  119  117 
2002    
Mean -0.1719%  -0.0564% 
t-statistic  (-1.80*) (-0.59) 
Standard Deviation  1.0613%  1.0244% 
Percentage Positive  33.33%  50.00% 
Number of Observations  123  114 
2003    
Mean 0.0134%  -0.0262% 
t-statistic  (0.17) (-0.68) 
Standard Deviation  0.8544%  0.4299% 
Percentage Positive  40.98%  43.09% 
Number of Observations  122  123 
2004    
Mean 0.0677%  0.0731% 
t-statistic  (1.32) (1.23) 
Standard Deviation  0.5689%  0.6381% 
Percentage Positive  58.54%  65.22% 
Number of Observations  123  115 
Pre-1999    
Mean 0.0332%  -0.0165% 
t-statistic  (1.16) (-0.53)   23







Standard Deviation  0.6722%  0.7123% 
Percentage Positive  54.18%  51.43% 
Number of Observations  550  525 
Post-1999    
Mean 0.0103%  -0.0047% 
t-statistic  (0.29) (-0.13) 
Standard deviation  0.8882%  0.9230% 
Percentage Positive  48.37%  53.99% 
Number of Observations  643  626 
1995-2004    
Mean 0.0208%  -0.0101% 
t-statistic  (0.90) (-0.41) 
Standard Deviation  0.7957%  0.8332% 
Percentage Positive  51.05%  52.82% 
Number of Observations  1193  1151 
 
Note: The data for this table are from the Trading Report of Securities Board, Nepal ( SEBO/N ) for the period 1995-
2004 ( t-statistics are in parenthesis).The first-half-of-the-month is the first through the fifteenth calendar day of 
the month, if it is a trading day, or if not, through the next trading day. The last-half-of-the- month consists of the 
remaining days as defined by Lakonishok and Smidt (1988). 
*  Significant at the 0.10 level for two-tailed test. 
**   Significant at the 0.05 level for a two tailed test. 
 
To make a further test of the half month effect, the following regression equation is run (Balaban 
& Bulu, 1996). 
        R t=β0+ β1d2t+ εt 
 
where the dependent variable (Rt) is the daily return on NEPSE index. The independent variable 
(d2t) is dichotomous variable. The variable d2t takes a value of one if the return occurs on the 
second-half-of-the-month days and 0 if the return occurs on first-half of the month as defined by 
Lakonishok and Smidt. The intercept β0 measures the mean return of the FHM period and the 
coefficients β1 measures the difference between the mean SHM return and the mean FHM return. 
εt is the error term. The regression model is tested for the null hypothesis H0: β1= 0 against the 
alternative hypothesis that there is no equality of mean FHM return and mean SHM return .The 
significant negative coefficient β1 confirms that there is existence of the half month effect. This 
approach is equivalent to regressing the returns on two daily dummies, with no constant term, and 
testing for the equality of all parameters. 
Table 8 
Regression Coefficients for the Half Month Effect in the Nepalese Stock Market 
 
 Period   β0  β1 Adjusted  R
2 F  statistic 
0.0412% -0.1026%  1995 
(0.54) (-0.93)  -0.07% 0.86 
-0.0422% -0.0306%  1996 
(-1.08) (-0.55)  -0.30%  0.30 
-0.0130% -0.0132%  1997 
(-0.23) (-0.16)  -0.42%  0.03 
0.0710% -0.1217%  1998 
(0.90) (-1.08)  0.08% 1.18 
0.1212% 0.1026%  1999 
(2.21**) (1.31) 0.31%  1.72 
0.2746% -0.0233%  2000 
(3.00**) (-0.18)  -0.41%  0.03   24
Continued Table 8 
 Period   β0  β1 Adjusted  R
2 F  statistic 
-0.1390% -0.2263%  2001 
(-1.33) (-1.53)  0.56% 2.34 
-0.1719% 0.1155%  2002 
(-1.83*) (0.85)  -0.12%  0.72 
0.0134% -0.0396%  2003 
(0.22) (-0.46)  -0.32%  0.21 
0.0677% 0.0054%  2004 
(1.24) (0.07)  -0.42%  0.00 
0.0332% -0.0497%  Pre-1999 
(1.12) (-1.18)  0.04%  1.39 
0.0103% -0.0149%  Post-1999 
(0.29) (-0.29)  -0.07%  0.09 
0.0208% -0.0309% 
1995-2004 
(0.88) (-0.92)  -0.01%  0.84 
 
Note: The data for this table are from the Trading Report of Securities Board, Nepal (SEBO/N) for the period 1995-2004 
( t-statistics are in parenthesis). 
*  Significant at the 0.10 level for two-tailed test. 
**   Significant at the 0.05 level for a two tailed test. 
 
    The regression results for each year as well as the sub period and whole period are given 
in Table 8. For the period 1995 to 2004, the null of equality of mean daily returns across halves of 
calendar months are rejected at the usual level of significance. The coefficient β1 representing the 
difference between the mean return of the first and second half of calendar months are negative 
and insignificant at usual level of significance. Lakonishok and Smidt obtain average difference 
between FHM and SHM return to be 0.237 percent.
17 However our findings show only small 
magnitude of 0.0309 percent for this. This result for total sample also holds for sub-periods and 
most of the individual years. The exception is year 1999 and 2002 where the coefficient β1 is 
insignificantly positive. Interestingly, β0 representing mean daily return for the FHM is 
undistinguishable from zero for these years only (exception is 2000). 
  To summarize, our results show no half-month effect irrespective of the period considered. In 
other words, there is no statistical difference between stock returns of the FHM and SHM. The 
result is consistent to that observed in the international markets: Lakonishok and Smidt (1988) for 
US market; Wong (1995) for stock markets of Singapore, Malaysia, Hong Kong, Taiwan and 
Thailand; Balaban & Bulu ( 1996) for  Istanbul Securities Exchange and Lauterbach and Uncar 
(1995) for Israeli Stock Market. 
 
Turn-of-the-Month (TOM) Effect 
  Table 9 reports the descriptive statistics for the four day turn–of–the–month (TOM) period (as 
defined by Lakonishok and Smidt (1988) and rest-of- the-month period (ROM).The results 
indicate that the average TOM and ROM returns are insignificant -0.0054 percent (t-statistics = -
0.14) and 0.0085 percent (t statistic= 0.45).This  results hold for only the pre-99 sub period . For 
the post-99 sub period, the direction of mean TOM and ROM return changes, but remains 
insignificant at the conventional level of significance. In addition, Table 9 shows that for year 
1999 (mean=0.2083 percent, t-statistic=5.09), 2000 (mean=0.2935 percent, t-statistic=3.83) and 
2004 (mean=0.0747 percent, t -statistic=1.75) the average ROM period return is positive and 
significantly different from zero. However, the average return is negative and significant for 2001 
(mean=-0.2085 percent, t-statistic=-0.2805) and 2003 (mean=-0.0629 percent, t-statistic= -0.0629) 
at usual level of significance.  
                                                 
17 Based on a t –test (5 percent significance level), they could not reject the null hypothesis that the two 
halves of the month have the same rate of return for any of the 10 periods. 
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  If the whole period is spilt into years, then we find no significant mean TOM return .The 
exception is the year 1995, for which the return is significant -0.1620 percent .(t-statistic=-1.65). 
Table 9 
Summary Statistics for the Turn-of-the-Month Effect in the Nepalese Stock Market 
 
Period Turn-of-the-Month  Rest-of-the-Month 
1995    
Mean -0.1620%  0.0245% 
t-statistic  (-1.89) (0.37) 
Standard Deviation  0.5552%  0.8495% 
Percentage Positive  38.10%  50.00% 
Number of Observations  42  168 
1996    
Mean -0.0940%  -0.0442% 
t-statistic  (-1.31) (-1.45) 
Standard Deviation  0.4977%  0.4219% 
Percentage Positive  31.25%  46.07% 
Number of Observations  48  191 
1997    
Mean -0.0029%  -0.0232% 
t-statistic  (-0.02) (-0.59) 
Standard Deviation  0.8702%  0.5349% 
Percentage Positive  45.83%  47.57% 
Number of Observations  48  185 
1998    
Mean 0.0425%  0.0023% 
t-statistic  (0.67) (0.03) 
Standard Deviation  0.4363%  0.9379% 
Percentage Positive  56.25%  63.98% 
Number of Observations  48  186 
1999    
Mean 0.0280%  0.2083% 
t-statistic  (0.27) (5.09**) 
Standard Deviation  0.7284%  0.5593% 
Percentage Positive  62.50%  69.52% 
Number of Observations  48  187 
2000    
Mean 0.1519%  0.2935% 
t-statistic  (1.63) (3.83**) 
Standard Deviation  0.6457%  1.0500% 
Percentage Positive  60.42%  64.36% 
Number of Observations  48  188 
2001    
Mean -0.1276%  -0.2805% 
t-statistic  (-0.67) (-3.52**) 
Standard Deviation  1.3168%  1.0924% 
Percentage Positive  54.17%%  39.36% 
Number of Observations  48  188 
2002    
Mean -0.1905%  -0.1014% 
t-statistic  (-1.33) (-1.32) 
Standard Deviation  0.9923%  1.0579% 
Percentage Positive  33.33%  42.86% 
Number of Observations  48  189 
2003    
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Table 9 Continued 
 
Period Turn-of-the-Month  Rest-of-the-Month 
Mean 0.2240%  -0.0629% 
t-statistic  (1.35) (-1.82*) 
Standard Deviation  1.1471%  0.4841% 
Percentage Positive  47.92%  40.61% 
Number of Observations  48  197 
2004    
Mean 0.0568%  0.0747% 
t-statistic  (0.60) (1.75*) 
Standard Deviation  0.6566%  0.5893% 
Percentage Positive  58.33%  63.16% 
Number of Observations  48  190 
Pre-1999    
Mean -0.0485%  0.0234% 
t-statistic  (-1.11) (0.97) 
Standard Deviation  0.6465%  0.7033% 
Percentage Positive  45.41%  54.67% 
Number of Observations  218  856 
Post-1999    
Mean 0.0313%  -0.0041% 
t-statistic  (0.52) (-0.15) 
Standard Deviation  0.9694%  0.8887% 
Percentage Positive  51.95%  51.04% 
Number of Observations  256  1013 
1995-2004    
Mean -0.0054%  0.0085% 
t-statistic  (-0.14) (0.45) 
Standard Deviation  0.8366%  0.8090% 
Percentage Positive  48.95%  52.70% 
Number of Observations  474  1869 
 
Note: The data for this table are from the Trading Report of Securities Board, Nepal (SEBO/N) for the period 1995-2004 
( t-statistics are in parenthesis). Turn-of-the-month days include the last trading day of the previous month and the 
first three trading days of the month and rest-of-the-month days consists of the remaining days of the month as 
defined by Lakonishok and Smidt (1988). 
*  Significant at the 0.10 level for two-tailed test. 
**   Significant at the 0.05 level for a two tailed test. 
 
To make a further test of the TOM effect, the following regression equation is run in line with 
Lakonishok and Smidt (1988) and (Compton, 2002). 
 
Rt = β0+ β1d2t+ εt 
 
where the dependent variable (Rt ) is the daily return on NEPSE index. The independent variable 
(d2t) is a dichotomous variable. The variable d2t takes a value of one if the return occurs on the 
TOM days and 0 if the return occurs on ROM days as defined by Lakonishok and Smidt (1988). 
The intercept β0 measures the mean return of the ROM period and the coefficients β1 measures the 
difference between the mean TOM return and the mean ROM return. εt is the error term. The 
regression model is tested for the null hypothesis H0: β1= 0 against the alternative hypothesis that 
there is no equality of mean TOM return and mean RHM return. The significant positive 
coefficient β1 confirms that there is an existence of the TOM effect. This approach is equivalent to 
regressing the returns on two daily dummies, with no constant term, and testing for the equality of 
all parameters. 
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Table 10 
Regression Coefficients for the Turn-of-the Month Effect in the Nepalese Stock Market 
 
Period  β0  β1 Adjusted  R
2 F  statistic 
0.0245% -0.1865%  1995 
(0.40) (-1.35) 
0.39% 1.83 
-0.0442% -0.0499%  1996 
(-1.39) (-0.71) 
-0.21% 0.50 
-0.0232% 0.0203%  1997 
(-0.51) (0.20) 
-0.41% 0.04 
0.0023% 0.0402%  1998 
(0.04) (0.29) 
-0.39% 0.08 
0.2083% -0.1803%  1999 
(4.77**) (-1.87*) 
1.05% 3.48* 
0.2935% -0.1416%  2000 
(4.10**) (-0.89) 
-0.09% 0.79 
-0.2805% 0.1529%  2001 
(-3.37**) (0.83) 
-0.13% 0.69 
-0.1014% -0.0891%  2002 
(-1.33) (-0.53) 
-0.31% 0.28 
-0.0629% 0.2869%  2003 
(-1.33) (2.68*) 
2.46% 7.16** 
0.0747% -0.0179%  2004 
(1.71**) (-0.18) 
-0.41% 0.03 
0.0234% -0.0719%  Pre-1999 
(0.99) (-1.37) 
0.08% 1.87 











Note: The data for this table are from the Trading Report of Securities Board, Nepal (SEBO/N) for the period 1995-2004 
( t-statistics are in parenthesis).  
*  Significant at the 0.10 level for two-tailed test. 
**   Significant at the 0.05 level for a two tailed test. 
 
  Table 10 reports the regression results for the full ten-year period, two sub-periods and 
individual years. The results show that, for total sample period the parametric test does not allow 
us to reject the null hypothesis of equality of mean return between the TOM period and ROM 
period. We also find that both the sub periods and most of the years exhibit consistent pattern. The 
exception is the year 1999 and 2003, for which we observe the significant coefficient, β1, (negative 
for 1999 and positive for 2000) at 5 percent level of significance, representing the statistical 
difference between the stock returns of the TOM period and ROM period.  
  To summarize, our results indicate that there is no TOM effect for the period 1995-2004 and 
for the sub periods pre-1999 and post-1999. If individual years are investigated separately, the 
paper reports a significant TOM effect for 2003 but inverted TOM effect for 1999.The result is 




  Table 11 reports the summary statistics for the stock returns during the first-third-of-the-
month, second -third-of-the-month and last -third-of-the-month. For the entire period, the mean 
rate of return around the first-third-of-the-month is insignificant at -0.0125 percent (t-statistic = 
0.32). In contrast to this, the average return during second-third-of-the-month and last-third-of-the-
month are positive and insignificant (mean=0.0092 percent, t- statistic=0.32 and mean=0.0214   28
percent,  t-statistic=0.77 respectively) at conventional level of significance. Interestingly, the 
expected last -third-of-the-month return is more than two times larger than both the expected 
return for the second -third-of-the-month and first-third-of-the-month. The result, however, 
changes both in magnitude and direction for the two sub periods. If individual years are examined 
separately, we find significant positive return for second-third and last-third-of-the-month for 1999 
(mean = 0.2114 percent, t-statistic = 4.03 and mean = 0.3163 percent and t-statistic = 4.85 
respectively) and 2000 (mean = 0.3591 percent, t-statistic = 3.44 and mean = 0.3610 percent and t-
statistic = 2.96 respectively) at five percent level of significance. However for year 2001, we 
observe negative and significant average return for second-third (mean = -0.3725 percent, t-
statistic= -2.80) and last-third (mean= -0.3913 percent, t-statistic = -3.34) of-the-month. In addition 
we also find that there does not exist a risk return relationship around the first-third, second-third 
and last-third of the calendar month. 
 
Table 11 
Summary Statistics for the Time-of-the-Month Effect in the Nepalese Stock Market         
 






1995      
Mean -0.0876%  0.1231%  -0.0741% 
t-statistic  (-0.84) (1.17)  (-0.98) 
Standard Deviation  0.8649%  0.8792%  0.6342% 
Percentage Positive  43.48%  54.29%  45.07% 
Number of Observations  69  70  71 
1996      
Mean -0.0723%  -0.0422%  -0.0412% 
t-statistic  (-1.52) (-0.80)  (-0.88) 
Standard Deviation  0.4318%  0.4757%  0.4042% 
Percentage Positive  37.80%  48.15%  44.00% 
Number of Observations  82  81  75 
1997      
Mean -0.0299%  0.0026%  -0.0344% 
t-statistic  (-0.38) (0.04)  (-0.59) 
Standard Deviation  0.7138%  0.6173%  0.5125% 
Percentage Positive  41.98%  56.16%  43.59% 
Number of Observations  81  73  78 
1998      
Mean 0.0723%  -0.0296%  0.0940% 
t-statistic  (1.47) (-0.28)  (1.50) 
Standard Deviation  0.4341%  0.9398%  0.5499% 
Percentage Positive  58.97%  63.29  66.23 
Number of Observations  78  79  77 
1999      
Mean -0.0909%  0.2114%  0.3163% 
t-statistic  (-0.75) (4.03**)  (4.85**) 
Standard Deviation  1.1195%  0.4569%  0.5608% 
Percentage Positive  61.18%  67.11%  74.32% 
Number of Observations  85  76  74 
2000      
Mean 0.0923%  0.3591  0.3610 
t-statistic  (0.93) (3.44**)  (2.96**) 
Standard Deviation  0.9103%  0.8786%  1.1053% 
Percentage Positive  61.18%  66.20%  64.63% 
Number of Observations  85  71  82 
2001      
Mean 0.0176%  -0.3725%  -0.3913% 
t-statistic  (0.13) (-2.80**)  (-3.34**) 
Standard Deviation  1.1855%  1.1578%  1.0484% 
Percentage Positive  58.23%  26.32%  42.50% 
Number of Observations  79  76  80 
2002      
Mean -0.1557%  -0.1872%  -0.0269%   29
Table 11 Continued 
 






t-statistic  (-1.30) (-1.63)  (-0.23) 
Standard Deviation  1.0550%  1.0165%  1.0590% 
Percentage Positive  33.33%  39.74%  48.78% 
Number of Observations  78  78  82 
2003      
Mean 0.0346%  -0.0314%  -0.0217% 
t-statistic  (0.31) (-0.60)  (-0.49) 
Standard Deviation  0.9994%  0.4627%  0.3978% 
Percentage Positive  37.80%  44.30%  43.90% 
Number of Observations  82  79  82 
2004      
Mean 0.0812%  0.0964%  0.0361% 
t-statistic  (1.32) (1.52)  (0.45) 
Standard Deviation  0.5557%  0.5693%  0.6898% 
Percentage Positive  59.26%  61.73%  65.33% 
Number of Observations  81  81  75 
Pre-1999      
Mean -0.0520%  0.0417%  0.0386% 
t-statistic  (-1.28) (1.09)  (1.30) 
Standard Deviation  0.7778%  0.7171%  0.5597% 
Percentage Positive  47.96%  57.39%  53.11% 
Number of Observations  367  352  354 
1995-2004      
Mean -0.0125%  0.0092%  0.0214% 
t-statistic  (-0.41) (0.32)  (0.77) 
Standard Deviation  0.8683%  0.7998%  0.7725% 
Percentage Positive  49.50%  52.62%  53.74% 
Number of Observations  800  764  776 
                                                                                                       
Note:  The data for this table are from the Trading Report of Securities Board, Nepal (SEBO/N ) for the period 1995-
2004 ( t-statistics are in parenthesis).The first third of month is from the 28th day of the previous month to the 7th day of 
the month, the second third of month is from the 8th day to the 17th day of the month and the last third of the month is 
from the 18th day to the 27th day of the month as defined by Kohers and Patel (1999). 
*  Significant at the 0.10 level for two-tailed test. 
**   Significant at the 0.05 level for a two tailed test. 
 
To make a further test of time-of-the-month effect the following regression equation with dummies 
is carried out in line with Kohers and Patel (1999), Lian (2002).  
 
Rt = β0+ β1d2t+ β2d3t+ εt 
 
where Rt is the mean return of the stock index on day t and the dummy variable dit indicates the 
day on which the return is observed (d2t = first-third-month days and d3t=second third month days). 
d2t attains a value of 1 if the return is observed on the first-third-of-the-month days,0 otherwise. 
Similar remarks apply to d3t. From basic econometrics we know that the coefficient  β0 measures 
the mean return for last third of the month and the coefficients β1 and  β2  measure the difference 
between the mean returns for first -third-of-the-month and last -third-of-the-month and  second-
third-of-the-month and last -third-of-the-month .εt is the error term. The regression model is tested 
for the null hypothesis H0: β1= β2= 0 against the alternative hypothesis that average returns around 
time-of-the-month are not equal. The significant (positive) coefficient of at least one dummy 
variable confirms that there is existence of the time-of-the-month effect. This approach is 
equivalent to regressing the returns on three daily dummies, with no constant term, and testing for 
the equality of all parameters. 
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Table 12 
Regression Coefficients for the Time-of-the-Month Effect in the Nepalese Stock Market 
 
Period  β0  β1  β2 Adjusted    R
2 F  statistic 
-0.0741% -0.0135%  0.1972%  1995 
(-0.78) (-0.10)  (1.46) 
0.50% 1.52 
-0.0412% -0.0312% -0.0011%  1996 
(-0.81) (-0.44) (-0.02) 
-0.74% 0.13 
-0.0344% 0.0045% 0.0370%  1997 
(-0.49) (0.05) (0.37) 
-0.80% 0.08 
0.0940% -0.0217% -0.1236%  1998 
(1.22) (-0.20) (-1.14) 
-0.22% 0.74 
0.3163% -0.4072% -0.1049%  1999 
(3.45**) (-3.25**)  (-0.82) 
3.95% 5.81** 
0.3610% -0.2687% -0.0019%  2000 
(3.36**) (-1.78) (-0.01) 
0.89% 2.07 
-0.3913% 0.4089% 0.0188%  2001 
(-3.09**) (2.28) (0.10) 
1.91% 3.28** 
-0.0269% -0.1289% -0.1603%  2002 
(-0.23) (-0.78) (-0.97) 
-0.40% 0.53 
-0.0217% 0.0564% -0.0097%  2003 
(-0.29) (0.53) (-0.09) 
-0.64% 0.22 
0.0361% 0.0452% 0.0603%  2004 
(0.52) (0.47) (0.62) 
-0.68% 0.21 
0.0386% -0.0906%  0.0031%  Pre-1999 
(1.05) (-1.76*)  (0.06) 
0.21% 2.14 
0.0070% 0.0140% -0.0256%  Post-1999 
(0.16) (0.23) (-0.41) 
-0.13% 0.21 
0.0214% -0.0339% -0.0122%  1995-2004 
(0.73) (-0.83) (-0.29) 
-0.06% 0.35 
 
Note: The data for this table are from the Trading Report of Securities Board, Nepal (SEBO/N) for the period 1995 to 
2004 (t-statistics are in parenthesis). 
**   5% significance level. 
* 10%  significance  level 
 
  The regression results of the third-month effect are presented in Table 12. The results support 
our null hypothesis. The coefficients β0 representing the mean last -third-of-the-month returns are 
insignificantly different from zero for the entire period and sub periods for which they are 
considered. The results are similar for coefficients β1 and β2 representing the difference between 
the first -third-of-the-month and last-third-of-the-month and second -third-of-the-month and last-
third-of-the-month third, except for pre-1999 for which β1 is significantly negative at five percent 
level of significance.  Further, the overall regression is significant at the five percent level of 
significance (F statistic=5.81). 
  In addition, we also observe the significantly negative β1 for 1999 and 2000 whereas 
significantly positive β1 for 2001 at usual level of significance, when we spilt the total sample 
period into years. To summarize, our results indicate no time-of-the-month effect for the entire 
period and sub-period, post-1999. However, for pre-1999, we obtain reverse time-of-the-month 
effect
18 that is inconsistent to US market. The result of the sub-period also holds for 1999 and 
2000. However, for 2001 we observe time-of-the-month effect consistent to the U.S. market 
(Kohers and Patel, 1999). 
 
                                                 
18 Lian (2002) obtain similar results that the mean daily return was not the highest in the first-third- of-the -
month but rather, for Malaysia, US, Japan and Singapore, in the last- third- of-the- month.   31
 
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
  The study had used the Nepal Stock Exchange’s return data to detect the presence of calendar 
anomalies for the period February 1, 1995 to December 31, 2004 using regression equation with 
seasonal dummies. 
  Our results show no evidence of month-of-the-year anomaly in stock returns. However, we 
find higher and positive (not significant) returns for October in contrast to that observed for 
January (significant) in international markets. We offer two possible explanations for this. The first 
explanation is based on the presence of Dashain and Tihar  (Great festivals of Hindu)  mostly 
occurring during October. Similar results were also obtained for Sri Lanka
19. The second 
explanation is based on the information hypothesis, i.e., release of more information as a result of 
compulsion of disclosure norms
20.  
  In regard to the day-of-the-week anomaly we observe different pattern than the one observed 
in the other developed capital markets. However our result regarding negative returns on Thursday 
is consistent to that obtained for the Greek stock market. No specific explanation can be attributed 
for this. 
  In case of the holiday effect, it does not exist for entire sample period as well as for sub 
periods but is perceptible for some years when the entire period is spilt into years. Unfortunately, 
the results of study do not remain stationary. Even though, the results of this analysis are not 
entirely consistent with the evidence of other international markets the result obtained for the year 
1998 and 2000 is consistent with those findings, suggesting that the holiday effect is a common 
phenomenon. However the result for 2002 shows inverted holiday effect, i.e., average post holiday 
return is greater than pre-holiday rate of return. 
  The results of the half-month effect analysis show the mean returns on the first-half of the 
month are higher than on the second half for most of the period considered. However, the 
difference is not statistically significant irrespective of the periods considered. In other words, the 
evidence shows no half-month anomaly that is consistent with the study on US market and 
emerging market. 
  In case of the TOM effect, the results show that the difference between the mean returns on 
TOM days and non-turn-of-the-month days is statistically insignificant for most of the periods. 
The exception is 1999 and 2003 for which we find inverted (negative) TOM effect and positive 
(traditional) TOM effect at the five percent level. The results are inconsistent with international 
evidence.  
  One should not be surprised with this result where various kinds of payments to investors are 
concentrated at the end of month in accordance to Bikram Sambat
21 rather than the Gregorian 
calendar in other countries. 
  With respect to the time-of-the-month effect, we obtain this effect for sub period pre- 1999 and 
for 1999 and 2000 that is inconsistent with the results in international market. However, for year 
2001 we obtain results similar to U.S. market. To be specific, we observe a disappearing time-of-
the-month effect. 
  The study thus concludes that NEPSE is not efficient in weak form if day-of-the-week 
anomaly is examined but weakly efficient in respect of other anomalies. In other words, investors 
can take advantage of information about the day-of–the-week when investing in the NEPSE
22. 
However, this may be due to market imperfections and thus is not necessarily embarrassing for 
market efficiency. Therefore, further research should be undertaken not only to conform the results 
                                                 
19 Empirical study on Sri Lanka observed insignificant   positive return for April, the month during which   
Sinhala and Tamil new-year falls. See Joshi (2004). 
20 Shrestha (2004) finds positive correlation between the NEPSE index and corporate disclosure. Also, see 
K.C. & Joshi  (2004). 
21 The first day of calendar month according to this corresponds to 15
th day of Gregorian month. 
22 Foreign investors can also benefit through international portfolio diversification in case of existence of 
calendar anomalies.   32
of the present study but also to examine the microstructure and operational procedure of the 
Nepalese Stock Exchange. In addition, it is necessary to investigate whether the reported 
anomalies are valid for individual shares or not
23. 
 
                                                 
23 The lack of these studies, inter alia, can be attributed to the unwillingness on the part of the Nepal Stock 
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